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SUMMARY
The advent of autonomous vehicles and UAVs offers additional support for disaster relief
efforts. These self-managing objects are able to gather data, deploy a wireless network,
and other simple routine maintenance tasks, freeing up aid workers to focus their efforts
on the rescue itself. Fleets of UAVs may deploy mobile communication networks, and
with their mobility advantage, also gather visual images of areas to coordinate relief
efforts. Autonomous vehicles may deploy a higher-powered wireless relay, and also
transport supplies or evacuate patients from treacherous areas without risking the life
of a driver. However, during these precarious situations, faults in the design of these
autonomous vehicles, should they be exposed and exploited, may worsen the disaster.
It is important to ensure that these deployed autonomous objects will execute both
safely and securely. In this chapter, we present a design methodology SysML-Sec in the
open-source toolkit TTool for the design and verification of both autonomous objects
and mission planning.
key words: Design Space Exploration, Systems-on-Chip, UML, Formal Specification, Model
Checking, TTool
1. Introduction
As explained by Tanzi et al. in the first volume of this book [1], communicating and
autonomous devices will surely have a play to role in the future Public Safety Networks.
The “communicating” feature comes from the fact that the information should be delivered
in a fast way to rescuers. The “autonomous” characteristic comes from the fact that rescuers
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should not have to concern themselves about these objects: they should perform their mission
autonomously so as not to delay the intervention of the rescuers, but rather to assist them
efficiently and reliably.
Previous work presented how such objects could play a role in PSN, either as an active agent
providing a direct support to the network, e.g. as a transmission relay, or as a data provider
fed into the network - e.g. a sensor gathering information and relying on the PSN to transmit
its data.
In particular, UAVs have already been proposed as a solution to cover both situations.
First, they provide a mobile communication network, usually by relying on a fleet of drones.
Second, they capture information from e.g. cameras, lidars, and forward these information to
the rescuers via the PSN [2]. Contributions in the area have underlined the fact that the drones
must be as autonomous as possible for the reasons previously indicated [3].
Other communicating objects can serve as relays: remote sensors, mobile phones, emergency
smart watches, smart medical appliances, etc: a PSN will be formed out of a potentially huge
set of Internet of Things dedicated to assistance in emergency situations: the Things for PSN
(TPSN). TPSNs differ from public Internet of Things because TPSNs are assumed to be
highly reliable and secure. Their high level of reliability is due to the fact that rescuers should
obtain the right information on time, and the fact that the object itself should not provoke
extra damages. The security and privacy constraint is due to the manipulation of highly
sensitive information during emergency situations, e.g., the information could be classified as
confidential or reserved for justice procedures. Thus, they should not be accessible to journalists
or to enemy governmental agencies.
Finally, TPSNs must be safe, secure and autonomous. This chapter focuses on the safety
and security aspects, and exemplifies them with an autonomous system. More precisely, we
present how these objects could be designed, and how their missions could easily be planned
and verified prior to any intervention.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we present concrete scenarios where
autonomous objects could play an interesting role. Section 3 presents the running example.
Section 4 presents our modeling and validation method named SysML-Sec. Then, section 5
presents how a mission validation can be modeled and performed with our approach. 6 explains
how our approach favourably complements similar contributions. Lastly, section 7 presents the
perspective of our approach.
2. Context
This section presents the roles that autonomous objects could play in the scope of an emergency
situation, and how they interact with the PSN deployed in the scope of an emergency situation.
We take the example of two different complex and autonomous objects: an autonomous UAV,
and an autonomous car. Figure 1 shows a possible scenario using UAVs and an Autonomous
Emergency Vehicle during disaster relief.
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Figure 1. UAVs and Autonomous Emergency Vehicle support during disaster relief
2.1. UAVs
UAVs could play a key role for the following missions described in [2]. The two first scenarios
rely on PSN in order to send their data to the rescuers. In the last scenario, the UAV has a
direct role on the PSN.
• Detection and monitoring of people/victims impacted by the crisis. Typically, the drone
has to identify groups of disabled persons, and to make a clear distinction between adults
and children. Cameras are a good option to find victims. When victims are buried, e.g.
when an earthquake occurred, another option is to rely on special antennas to track
the electromagnetic fields emitted by personal electronic devices, e.g. smartphones and
smartwatches. Indoor navigation could also be used to find victims within building on
fire. Last, drones could be used to inform the victims about the situation, e.g. with loud
audio messages.
• The continuous assessment of the situation status concerning the impacted area. This
task includes the identification of best access roads to the disaster area and to the victims.
In this context, “best” may refer to “safe”, or “fast”.
• Offering a mobile relay to the wireless section of the PSN. Contributions in the domain
commonly propose using a fleet of drones in order to cover larger wireless communication
areas.
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2.2. Autonomous cars
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Figure 2. Autonomous Emergency Vehicle
Compared to UAVs, autonomous cars can carry more equipment, have a longer operational
time, but are restricted to only slightly damaged areas with traversable roads. Figure 2 shows
an Autonomous Emergency Vehicle with sensors and a wireless relay. Their use within an
emergency situation includes:
• Carrying material, e.g., bringing water, food or medicines to victims, bringing rescue
equipment to rescuers, and bringing energy to other equipments, e.g. reloading
spots/charging stations for UAVs. They could also be used to carry victims from
dangerous areas without risking the life of a driver.
• Assessing a situation. An autonomous car can easily investigate road quality. It can also
deploy its own sensors for data collection.
• Serving as a mobile wireless relay. Emission power can be much higher that of an UAV,
but with reduced mobility.
3. Case Study
As own running example, we examine the design of an Autonomous Emergency Vehicle capable
of the disaster relief tasks as previously presented. The autonomous vehicle must coordinate
with Central Command, receiving command regarding future destinations or operational tasks,
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and updated road conditions, while sending gathered data concerning current status of the
affected area.
In addition, the Autonomous Emergency Vehicle must navigate to destinations, calculating
routes and vehicular operations based on incoming sensor data, such as braking and steering.
We present its design in the context of the stages of the SysML-Sec methodology in the
following section.
4. Our approach: SysML-Sec
4.1. Methodology
The SysML-Sec methodology, summarized in Figure 3, addresses all stages in the design of an
embedded system, with simulation and verification at each stage [4]. We present an overview
of all three stages before describing the partitioning stage in detail.
SW/HW Partitioning SW/HW Partitioning 
RequirementsRequirements
Architectural viewArchitectural view
Mapping viewMapping view
Application viewApplication view
SW Analysis
SW Design
SW Analysis
SW Design
Structural viewStructural view Behavioral viewBehavioral view
Deployment viewDeployment viewTest
AttacksAttacks
AssumptionsAssumptions
Use case viewUse case view Scenario viewScenario view
Simulation
Formal analysis
Simulation
Formal analysis
Simulation
Formal analysis
Simulation
Formal analysis
Figure 3. Overall SysML-Sec Methodology
4.2. Analysis Stage
The Requirements/Attacks stage (left section of Figure 3) intends to identify and analyze
requirements and attacks together with the main application functions. Requirement graphs
help the designer consider the complete system in the first phases of design and serve as a
reference for design teams. Figure 4 shows an excerpt of the Environment-related Security
Requirements for an autonomous vehicle. Requirements are clarified by being divided into
more detailed requirements, until details of their implementation may be described with a <<
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deriveReq >> operator. As designers refine the model, they should constantly refer back to
the Requirements graphs to ensure they have adhered to the standards.
Figure 4. Extract of Autonomous Vehicle Requirements Diagram
Researchers have recently discovered many vulnerabilities in connected cars. In [5], the
authors demonstrated that they could control a vehicle through the Onboard Diagnostic Port
(OBD-II) by sending their own generated CAN messages. As many aftermarket devices plug
into the OBD-II port and can be managed by smartphone, the compromise of these devices
could allow an attacker to remotely control the vehicle. The authors later [6] presented other
vulnerabilities, such as a buffer overflow bug which could be exploited so that playing a WMA
file would send CAN packets. Most notably, Miller and Valsasek [7] used a vulnerable internet
connectivity feature to modify firmware and send forged CAN messages to remotely control
the vehicle. This attack required no physical access to the targeted vehicle, as it could attack
any vehicle on the Sprint network.
The additional connectivity required of autonomous vehicles provides even more avenues
of attack, so the consideration of these attacks is vital to the design process. We capture
attack scenarios (which exploit combinations of vulnerabilities) with formally defined attack
graphs [8]. Once defined, these graphs can be easily migrated for reuse in analysis of other
systems. Attacks can be linked together in order to assess the impact of a specific vulnerability
and the need to address it at the risk assessment phase, e.g., once a mapping is under
evaluation.
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Threats are displayed in blocks representing the target of the attacks, better presenting the
attacks in the context of assets. Attacks (<< attack >> stereotype) can be linked together
with primitive operators. Those operators are either logical operators like AND, OR, and
XOR, or temporal causality operators like SEQUENCE, BEFORE, or AFTER. We consider
the temporal constructs describe the attackers operational point of view in embedded systems,
in situations where there is a maximum duration between two causally related attacks. For
example, when attacking a system with time-limited authentication tokens, the token must be
first retrieved, and then the use of this token must occur before its expiration.
Attack instances in different parametric diagrams can be linked together in order to assess
the impact of a specific vulnerability and the need to address it at the risk assessment phase.
An attack can also be tagged as a root attack, meaning that this attack is at the top of a
tree of attacks. Attacks can be linked to requirements, thus allowing an automated check of
the coverage of attacks by verifying whether each attack is linked to at least one security
requirement.
Figure 5 shows a sample attack of recovering GPS data regarding previous destinations,
violating user privacy. We predict that the attacker could target either the GPS Gateway or
Navigation Control. For example, to succeed in the attack via the GPS Gateway, the attacker
must send a command to the GPS to access previous locations, send the data to the attacker,
and also interpret or decrypt the received GPS data. The details of individual attacks may be
presented in their own attack graphs, such as the steps to gain access to Navigation Control
messaging system. As the system is developed, designers may correct vulnerabilities and then
indicate certain attacks are impossible. Afterwards, formal verification determines which root
attacks are still possible in the system.
Figure 5. Sample Attack Modeling
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4.3. Hardware/Software Partitioning
The Hardware/Software Partitioning stage (upper right of Figure 3) intends to determine
what is the best way to implement the embedded system. For example, from a flexibility
point of view, software is preferable to hardware. On the contrary, from a power consumption
point of view, hardware should be used first. Thus, designing a complex embedded system,
such as the embedded system of an autonomous car, requires the use of this methodological
stage. Usually, a partitioning follows the Y-chart approach (as shown in the upper right
section of Figure 3), first modeling the abstract functional tasks (Application View), candidate
architectures (Architectural View), and finally mapping tasks to the hardware components
(Mapping View) [9]. Simulation and verification techniques are applied at mapping stage to
decide whether the selected architecture complies with the system’s requirement. The HW/SW
Partitioning phase of SysML-Sec follows this approach.
4.3.1. Application View
The Application View comprises of a set of communicating tasks. The behavior of tasks is
described abstractly. Functional abstraction allows us to ignore the exact calculations and
data processing of algorithms, and consider only their relative execution time. Data abstraction
allows us to consider only the size of data sent or received, and ignore details such as type,
values, or names. On the Component Design Diagram, an extension of the SysML Block
Instance Diagram, the designer specifies the list of tasks, and within the task, attributes and
ports indicating communication. Purple ports indicate event-based communication and blue
ports indicate channel-based communication. Events notify another task about an event, such
as the start of a function or a hardware interrupt. Channels are used for the transfer of data.
Activity diagrams are used to give a behavior to tasks.
Figure 6 shows the Component Design Diagram of the Autonomous Vehicle in our case
study. The design includes a main task “Navigation Control” communicating with “Sensor
Gateway” managing all sensor data, “GPS Gateway” managing location data, “Command
Gateway” managing commands of new destinations or tasks from Central Command. Based
on the input data, Navigation Control calculates a trajectory and sends the driving commands
to “Vehicle Control Gateway” which then interfaces with the ECUs.
The activity diagram of the Navigation Task is shown in Figure 7. The navigation system
starts with an initialization sequence modeled only as an execution time. Next, the Send
Event operator signals a start to the GPS Gateway. After the initialization, the navigation
task continually waits for any of the 3 possible signals from the other tasks as indicated by the
Select Event operator. For example, if it receives the “update Location” event from the GPS,
it acquires the new GPS data with the Read Channel operator. Next, it calculates the route
based on the new data. If route calculation fails, it processes the error, and if it succeeds, it
forges a new command and sends it to the Vehicle Control Gateway by writing data to the
“vehData” channel. We model these possibilities with the Choice operator. The loop for ever
operator indicates that when one execution branch finishes, execution returns to the start of
the loop, and executes the Select Event operator again.
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Figure 6. Application View: Component Diagram of Autonomous Vehicle System
4.3.2. Architectural View
The architectural model displays the underlying architecture as a network of abstract execution
nodes, communication nodes, and storage nodes. Execution nodes consist of CPUs and
Hardware Accelerators, defined by parameters for simulation. All execution nodes must be
described by data size, instruction execution time, and clock ratio. CPUs can further be
customized with specific parameters e.g.cache-miss percentage, and with information regarding
Operating System and middleware properties, e.g., scheduling policy, task switching time, etc.
Communication nodes include bridges and buses. Buses connect execution and storage
nodes for task communication and data storage or exchange, and bridges connect buses.
Buses are characterized by their arbitration policy, data size, clock ratio, etc, and bridges
are characterized by data size and clock ratio. Storage nodes are Memories, which are defined
by data size and clock ratio.
4.3.3. Mapping View
Mapping partitions the application into software and hardware as well as specifying the location
of their implementation on the architectural model. A task mapped onto a processor will be
implemented in software, and a task mapped onto a hardware accelerator will be implemented
in hardware. The exact physical path of a data/event write may also be specified by mapping
channels to buses and bridges, or through associated Communication Patterns [10].
4.4. Software/System Design
Finally, the Software/System Design stage (lower right of Figure 3) develops the functions
mapped onto processors at the previous stage. A Partitioning model may be automatically
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Figure 7. Application View: Activity Diagram for Autonomous Vehicle Navigation System
translated into the Software/System Design model. Functions to be implemented are first
analyzed with SysML-based use case and scenario views to determine a software design. A
software design consists of SysML blocks and their interactions, such as operations on data,
signal exchange, security protocols. Formal verification intends to prove correct functionality
and resilience of the system under design to threats. The functional design is refined until it
can be transformed to prototyping code.
Figure 8 shows the model of the Autonomous System and the environment. As sensor and
navigation algorithms are added, the system’s response to various environmental conditions
can be simulated and studied.
4.5. Assumptions
Iterations over the complete method are assumption-driven [11]. More precisely, the system
specification is first limited in scope, then progressively advanced to include further details.
For example, we might first develop the design for functionality of the system, assuming no
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Figure 8. Autonomous Vehicle Software/System Design model
attacks are possible. In the next iteration, we remove the assumption on complete lack of
attackers and add in security mechanisms, continually evolving the design.
Typical assumptions we could take when designing autonomous cars are “the sensors will
never fail” (assumption on the environment), “the power supply of the ECUs will never fail”
(assumption on the environment), “the plausibility check function will be ignored” (assumption
on the system to be designed). Then, progressively, the system will be refined, and these
assumptions will be removed, apart if they are part of the system specification.
4.6. Tooling
All modeling, formal verification, simulation, and code generation is performed within the
supporting toolkit TTool. TTool supports the automatic proof from diagrams at the push of a
button. Safety proofs can be performed with integrated model-checkers or with UPPAAL [12].
Security proofs are done with ProVerif [13]. For user convenience, results of verifications are
also back-traced to the graphical models, without having to investigate the results provided
by UPPAAL and ProVerif.
Figure 9 shows a screenshot of TTool. The center shows Diagram Editor displaying the
Architecture Diagram of the autonomous vehicle. The left panel shows navigation, search, and
analysis tools. The verification and code generation tools are displayed along the top toolbar
as labeled.
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Figure 9. Screenshot of TTool
4.7. Safety
During partitioning, simulations and formal verification can be used to study safety properties
such as schedulability and worst case execution time on a specific architecture. Using execution
cycle estimates of algorithms... For example, in the Autonomous Navigation system, we ensure
that the max processing time for obstacle detection is ... Once mapping is complete, formal
verification confirms reachability of all critical states. Simulations take into account time and
show the step by step execution of the application, along with CPU and bus usage. For example,
we may wish to determine if each sample of sensor data is processed by the Navigation Unit
within a certain time, or ensuring that the vehicle will respond in time to dodge an obstacle.
High bus or CPU contention may encourage us to modify the architecture or re-do the mapping,
such as providing each Gateway unit with its own CPU.
UPPAAl is a model checker for networks of timed automata. The behavioral model of a
system to be verfied is translated into a UPPAAL specification. Safety Proofs conducted with
UPPAAL check for unwanted behavior through translation of the model into an automata. For
example, UPPAAL may verify the lack of deadlock, such as two threads both waiting for the
other to send a message. Behavior may be verified through “Reachability”, “Leads to”, and
other general statements. “Leads to” allows us to verify that one state must always be followed
by another. For example, in the Autonomous Response Vehicle model, “Abort Mission” by the
central command should always be followed by Navigation control executing “Return to base”.
The model checker can also verify a statement for all execution flows, A[], or the existence
of a single execution flow E<>. For example, it may verify that a state “Route Found” is
reachable, with E<> NavigationControl.RouteFound. Critical properties must be preserved
at all time, such as the vehicle not continuing to drive when the road is blocked. We might
also verify that the Autonomous Vehicle does not send the message when a process error is
detected.
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4.8. Security
In our context — security in embedded systems —, we focus on the properties of authenticity
and confidentiality. These properties are explained in the scope of rescue missions with UAVs
and autonomous cars.
Authenticity (or integrity) confirms that a piece of data received by an entity really
did originate from the expected sender, and that it was not tampered with. It means that,
for a particular exchange, a received message really does correspond to a message sent by
the expected entity. In an embedded system, a failure to enforce authenticity may allow an
attacker to forge messages, impersonate a trusted component (such as a remote controller),
and change the behavior of a system. For example, an attacker forging sensor data may cause
an autonomous vehicle’s Navigation Control to calculate trajectory based on the injected
data, fail to detect an obstacle, and end up in an accident, resulting in the mission failure,
and potentially additional victims. UAVs have already been shown to be vulnerable to GPS
spoofing [14].
Confidentiality, in our context, deals with the privacy of sensitive data, such as personal
information or credentials. For instance, keys stored in a Trusted Platform Module should
probably not be broadcast across an insecure channel. For proposed disaster-relief drones,
captured images of victims is sensitive and, for the sake of privacy, they should not be allowed
to be intercepted and posted online or published [15]. Also, drones capable of generating a 3D
mapping of a building carry a detailed architectural plan of an area, which could be valuable
to criminals targeting this location. Even if an attacker physically steals a drone, the on-board
sensitive information should remain confidential.
Security analysis is performed with ProVerif, a verification tool operating on designs
described in pi-calculus [13]. A ProVerif specification consists of a set of processes
communicating on public and private channels. Processes can split to create concurrently
executing processes, and replicate to model multiple executions (sessions) of a given protocol.
Cryptographic primitives such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption or hash can be
modeled through constructor and destructor functions. ProVerif assumes a Dolev-Yao attacker,
which is a threat model in which anyone can read or write on any public channel, create new
messages or apply known primitives.
ProVerif provides its user with the capabilities to query the confidentiality of a piece of
data, the authenticity of an exchange, or the reachability of a state. Traces are generated for
all possible execution paths. The tool then presents a result to the user that is either true if
the property is verified, false if a trace that falsifies the property has been found, or cannot be
proved if ProVerif failed in asserting or refuting the queried property.
4.9. Security Modeling
Security properties can be modeled starting from the Partitioning Phase. On the architectural
modeling, buses can be specified as public or private. For example, devices communicating on a
WiFi network would be modeled as exchanging over a public bus, while the internal bus would
be modeled as private. Private buses are marked secure with a green shield.. The distinctions
between bus types also model assumed attacker capabilities: if we assume that an attacker
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has no physical access to the system, then we can describe internal buses as private, but if an
attacker could physically probe the bus, then it must be indicated as public.
On the application modeling, we use Cryptographic Configurations to model security
elements. The configuration types include Symmetric Encryption, Asymmetric Encryption,
Hash, Nonce, Key, etc. For each security type, the configuration provides by default estimated
values for overhead (additional bits added to the message) and Computational Complexity
(additional execution cycles) to help engineers less familiar with security mechanisms. A
Cryptographic Configuration can be added as a tag to channels to indicate the data exchanged
was first encrypted before transfer. Nonces can be added to messages before encryption.
During the Software/System Design phase, crypto-blocks and encryption/decryption
operators are used to model how data is secured. The exchange and subsequent encryption of
data is mathematically analyzed to determine if it’s vulnerable to an attacker. For example, the
attacker should not be able to forge messages between the command center and autonomous
emergency vehicle. Also, we wish to verify the strong authenticity of a message, protecting
against replay attacks, that is an attacker recoding a previsouly sent message, and sending it
again later on.
5. Mission planning
This section investigates how to formally validate that within a given mission, the system
under design — in our case, the autonomous system — will correctly handle its mission in a
safe, secure and efficient way.
It is unrealistic to test all possible outcomes and execution flows of a mission by hand, and
logical flaws or undesired corner cases may not be obvious in a larger model. In particular,
the partitioning and design of the system is evaluated with regards to a given environment
model, and for a set of standard missions and situations. Thus, for a specific rescue mission,
we suggest modeling the mission and then formally verifying it with TTool. Combined with
a model of the selected equipment, we can ensure that the mission is possible before sending
out the vehicles. We can add “Error states” within the activity diagram, where the state can’t
be reached in normal operation, and then use UPPAAL to verify the non-reachability of that
state.
The methodology is shown in Figure 10. We start by providing a general behavioral model of
the vehicles to be used, which is then refined until it is successfully validated. Then, the specific
mission itself is modeled. The formal verifier determines if the mission is feasible under given
constraints. If verification of the mission fails, then the engineer must either revise the mission
parameters or choose different vehicles to perform the mission, and perform verification again.
If the mission is verified possible, then TTool generates code automatically to be loaded aboard
the vehicle. For example, we can determine if the UAV is capable of reaching a destination in
a given time. We present a simple example with one UAV and one autonomous vehicle.
While it is unnecessary to ensure the mission succeeds in all possible circumstance,s it is
necessary to verify that the mission is capable of succeeding. However, it is necessary to ensure
that no unsafe situations occur, such as the autonomous vehicle continuing to drive on a
road which has been detected damaged. In a mission to deploy a mobile relay, typical mission
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Figure 10. Mission Planning Flowchart
verification would involve estimating the feasibility of the solution, taking into account battery
life, travel distance, and length of deployment.
Mission planning can involve several vehicles at the same time, and investigate how/when
they can collaborate to better fulfill the mission. For example, in the case of a mobile relay,
the mission planner can be used to determine how many UAVs shall be used to provide a relay
in a given location, taking into account the time to reach the position, the operational time,
the time to return, and finally the time to recharge the batteries. It could also be used to
model how many backup drones shall be used, and where they should positioned to minimize
network failure whenever a current UAV relay fails.
5.1. Mission description
In this example, we propose a mission with 1 UAV, 1 Autonomous Emergency Vehicle,
and Central Command which coordinates with both objects. The UAV must scout out a
set of locations and send back images, to determine if roads are accessible to the vehicle.
Based on road conditions, Central Command directs the Delivery Vehicle to destinations. The
Autonomous Emergency Vehicle delivers supplies to directed destinations until none remain,
and then returns to base.
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The detailed activity diagrams for the actors are shown in Figure 11 and 12. Central
Command continually monitors the status of both vehicles, and if inclement weather arises,
sends an abort mission message to direct them to return. Using image data sent from the UAV,
Central Command automatically processes the data to detect if a destination is reachable or
not for the Emergency Vehicle, and sends the Emergency Vehicle the new destination. If no
delivery destinations remain, then it directs the Emergency Vehicle to return to base. Red Xs
mark states that UPPAAL should verify reachable.
Figure 11. Central Command Activity Diagram
Many vital safety properties must be verified for the mission. For example, the UAV must
verify roads to a destination are accessible before the Emergency Vehicle begins to travel.
Therefore, there must be no state where the Emergency Vehicle is traveling while the UAV
has returned to base. To query this statement in UPPAAL, we write
"E<> UAV.return && AV.travel"
The statement verifies if there exists a state where the UAV is in the return state and the
Emergency Vehicle is still traveling.
We also verify correctness in behavior. For example, if Central Command directs to abort
the mission, then both the UAV and Emergency Vehicle will return. We express this with a
“Leads to” statement,
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Figure 12. Autonomous Delivery Vehicle and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Activity Diagrams
"CentralCommand.abortMission --> UAV.return"
In other words, every time state “abortMission” is reached, it must eventually be followed by
the state “return”.
These statements may be entered directly on the UPPAAL model checker, or permanently
stored on the model as pragma to be verified in UPPAAL. Their most recent verification status
is displayed as a X or a check mark. The pragma is displayed on the block diagram as shown
in Figure 13. As shown, UPPAAL has verified that both the UAV and Emergency Vehicle will
return after an “abort mission” command. Also, there is never the case where the Emergency
Vehicle is traveling while the UAV has returned.
5.2. Integration of Mission Planning and Autonomous Vehicle
In figure 14, we evaluated the partitioning of the AV alone. The figure depicts the mapping
view back-traced with the simulation information, e.g. the CPU and bus load. Terminated
tasks are depicted in red, and blocked tasks in orange.
We add the mission-specific details to the command module to evaluate the performance
impact to determine if the partitioning of the system can still be successfully validated. With
the mission loaded, the task Navigation Control must process the new commands, increasing
the load on its CPU as shown in Figure 15. Other CPUs and the bus have a lower load
because the task “Navigation Control” now creates starvation for other tasks. Thus, a better
partitioning would be to increase the CPU frequency, or to discharge this task with hardware
accelerators.
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Figure 13. Mission Model showing verified Safety Properties
Figure 14. Simulation for System without Mission
6. Related Work
6.1. Embedded System Design
Many toolkits support modeling of embedded systems. They support various stages of the
design process.
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Figure 15. Simulation for System with Mission
Capella [16] relies on Arcadia, a comprehensive model-based engineering method. It
provides architecture diagrams allocating functions to components, allocation of Behavioral
Components onto Implementation Components (typically hardware, but not necessarily).
Capella provides advanced mechanisms to model bit-precise data structures, and relate them
to Functional Exchanges, Component or Function Ports, Interfaces, etc. Capella is however
more business focused and supports multiple methodologies.
Design Space Exploration (DSE) of Systems-on-Chip is the process of analyzing various
functionally equivalent implementation alternatives to select an optimal solution [17]. The most
suitable design is commonly chosen based on metrics such as functionality, performance, cost,
power, reliability, and flexibility. At system-level, DSE is challenging because the system design
space is extremely large and so usual simulation-based analysis techniques fail to efficiently
observe the above mentioned metrics. Contributions on DSE environments such as [18–24]
generally rely on a high-level language to describe application functions and architectures. For
example, [22–24] rely on UML or MARTE diagrams.
The Architecture Analysis & Design Language (AADL [25]) is a standard from the
International Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). It allows the use of formal methods
for safety-critical real-time systems in avionics, automotives, and other domains. Similar to
our environment, a processor model can have different underlying implementations and its
characteristics can easily be changed at the modeling stage.
6.2. Safety
As safety is important in the management of UAVs and other robotic systems, many previous
works have used formal methods to validate mission planning or autonomous systems. [26]
used a hybrid partial order forward chaining framework for mission planning. The framework
monitors the states of its agents and formally determines allowed new actions based on
the current state structure. The system is intended to be used for collaborative Unmanned
Aircraft Systems. Similarly, [27] formally validated collective robot systems with KLAIM.
Their approach studies robots with a common goal, communicating with each other instead
of a central command. Verification analyzes the probabilities of fulfillment of desired formal
properties expressed in stochastic logic MoSL. Our approach relies on central command
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to communicate with individual autonomous agents and dynamically alter the mission in
accordance with environmental conditions. Our verification in UPPAAL relies on states and
reachability properties to determine mission success.
Other works validated the architecture and design of the autonomous systems themselves.
[28] used Promela/Spin and Gwendolen/AJPF for rule checking Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
The UAS must obey “Rules of the Air”, such as detecting collisions and evading them.
SPIN/POMELA were used for fast, high-level modeling, and Gwendolen for slower, detailed
modeling of interactions. [29] validated the safety architecture of autonomous systems with
Event-B. The work intended to verify that the probability of a crash would be less than 10−9
per flight hour, and a single failure did not cause a crash. Our safety verification, however,
intends to verify system behaviors and is not concerned with probabilities.
UPPAAL has been used for generally for the formal verification of protocols or designs,
such as the Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector routing protocol in [30]. The derived
UPPAAL model of the protocol was verified to process all routing messages, and after
processing, only optimal routes are found. [31] demonstrated how to use UPPAAL for analysis
of timeliness properties of embedded system architectures. However, their automata were
manually generated while ours are automatically generated.
6.3. Security
Many projects verify security properties of embedded systems and security protocols. [32]
presents a threat model of possible attacks on UAVs to assist designers with risk analysis.
Attacks are categorized into Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability, and then further
separated by origin or location of attack.
The Knowledge Acquisition in Automated Specifications approach Security Extension aims
to identify security requirements for software systems [33]. The methodology uses a goal-
oriented framework and builds a model of the system, and then an anti-model which describes
possible attacks on the system. Both models are incrementally developed: threat trees are
derived from the anti-model and the system model adds security countermeasures to protect
against the attacks described in the anti-model.
The Combined Harm Assessment of Safety and Security for Information Systems (CHASSIS)
method considers safety and security together in a common model [34]. Safety and security
hazards in the form of misuse cases are developed, and then trade-off analysis to unify all
requirements and identify when safety and security conflict. While these techniques targeting
the requirements and analysis phase offer a detailed approach to considering threats against
safety and security, they are not yet automated.
Other approaches offer comprehensive modeling of security mechanisms intended for the
Software/System Design phase. For example, UMLSec [35] is a UML profile for expressing
security concepts, such as encryption mechanisms and attack scenarios. It provides a modeling
framework to define security properties of software components and of their composition within
a UML framework. It also features a rather complete framework addressing various stages
of model-driven secure software engineering from the specification of security requirements
to tests, including logic-based formal verification regarding the composition of software
components.
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SecureUML enabled the design and analysis of secure systems by adding mechanisms
to model role-based access control [36]. Authorization constraints are expressed in Object
Constraint Language (OCL) for formal verification. Our security model focuses on protecting
against an external attacker instead of access control. In contrast to formula-based constraints
or queries, our approach to security analysis relies on graphically annotating the security
properties to query within the model. Our methodology considers security at all stages of the
design process, validating partitioning models as well as protocols.
7. Conclusion and perspectives
UAVs and autonomous vehicles may perform routine or dangerous tasks, assisting rescue
workers during disaster relief efforts. However, it is important to ensure these autonomous
objects are safe and secure, so that they may not be hijacked, leak sensitive data, or further
injure victims. We presented how the toolkit TTool can automatically verify missions or
autonomous vehicles, requiring no knowledge of the verification languages for a designer.
The main advantage of these UAVs and autonomous vehicles is their ability to free up
relief workers to focus on critical tasks. Mission planning and management should require
as little manual input as possible. However, mission planning with autonomous objects
requires specification of a mission, vehicle characteristics, and communications between
central command and all vehicles. Currently, TTool performs validation and code generation
automatically, but still requires that a user to manually enter the mission diagrams.
In future work, we consider the addition of new views/diagrams specific to mission planning.
Libraries/Patterns modeling common situations/mission requirements will allow for easier and
more efficient design of missions. Instead of manually building states and transitions in the
diagram, these mission patterns could allow a user to specify only the high-level behavior and
automatically receive the low-level implementation details. For example, a user might specify
only ”deploy at location X for time Y”, and the UAV would generate their activity diagram,
including navigation, battery management, etc.
Furthermore, we will increase the automatic exploration capabilities of TTool, such as
automatic selection of vehicles capable of carrying out the current mission. Generic models
for common autonomous objects could be provided, allowing the user to customize them
with only certain device-specific parameters such as speed, battery life, etc. These mission-
focused additions to TTool will better assist relief workers with the automatic planning and
management of UAVs and autonomous vehicles, improving the execution and efficiency of
rescue efforts during disasters.
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